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GLEANINGS 



FROM 



Dugald Stewarts Works, 



WITH ADDITIONS. 



Influence of Opinions on Happiness. 



SELECTED, PREPARED AND PUBLISHED 



M ( 







BY 



ROSS WINANS. 






BALTIMORE: 

JOHN P. DES FORGES 

1872. 



:^%^ 






GLEANINGS 



By Opinions are here meant, not merely 
speculative conclusions to which we have 
given our assent, but convictions which have 
taken root in the mind, and have an habitual 
influence on the conduct, 

Of these opinions a very great and impor- 
tant part are, in the case of all mankind, 
interwoven by education with their first habit 
of thinking ; or are insensibly imbibed from 
the manners of the times. 

Where such opinions are erroneous, they 
may often be corrected, to a great degree, by 
the persevering efforts of a reflecting and a 
vigorous mind ; but as the number of minds 
capable of reflection is comparatively small, 
it becomes a duty on all who have themselves 
experienced the happy effects of juster and 
more elevated principles to impart, as far as 
they are able, the same blessing to others. 



To habituate the minds of children to those 
occupations and enjoyments which afford the 
most genuine and substantial satisfaction is of 
the utmost importance : and if education were 
judiciously employed to second, in this respect 
the recommendations of nature, the charms of 
life would be the greater. 

Choose that course of action — says Pytha- 
goras-— which is best, and custom will soon 
render it the most agreeable. 

The foregoing remarks relate to what may 
be called the essentials of happiness ; — the 
circumstances w T hich constitute the general 
state or habit of mind, that is necessary to lay 
a ground work for every other enjoyment. 

This foundation being supposed, the sum of 
happiness enjoyed by an individual will be 
proportioned to the degree in which he is able 
to secure all the various pleasures belonging 
to our nature. 

These pleasures may be referred to the 
following heads : — 

1. The pleasures of Activity and Repose. 

2. The pleasures of Sense. 

3. The pleasures of Imagination. 

4. The pleasures of the Understanding. 

5. The pleasures of the Heart. 



The wisest plan of economy, with respect 
to our pleasures, is not merely compatible 
with a strict observance of the rules of mor- 
ality, but is, in a great measure, compre- 
hended in these rules, and therefore, that the 
happiness, as well as the perfection of our 
nature, consists in doing our duty, with as 
little solicitude about the event as is consis- 
tent with the weakness of humanitv. 

He, whose ruling principle of action is a 
sense of Duty, conducts himself in the busi- 
ness of life with boldness, consistency, and 
dignity, finds himself rewarded by that happi- 
ness which so often eludes the pursuit of those 
who exert every faculty of the mind, in order 
to attain it. 

The various duties of life agree with each 
other in one common quality, that of being 
obligatory on rational and voluntary agents ; 
and they are all enjoined by the same authori- 
ty ; — the authority of conscience. These 
duties, therefore, are but different articles of 
one law, which is properly expressed by the 
word Virtue ; [or still more unequivocably, by 
the phrase, Moral Law of Nature.] 

A man, whose ruling or habitual principle 
of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to 



6 

what is Right, may be properly denominated 
Virtuous. 

The practice of morality, is facilitated by 
repeated acts ; and, therefore the word Virtue, 
may with propriety be employed to express 
that habit of mind which it is the great object 
of a good man to confirm. 

A sense of duty, and an enlightened regard 
to our own happiness, conspire in most in- 
stances to give the same direction to our con- 
duct, so as to put it beyond a doubt that, even 
in this world, a virtuous life is true wisdom. 
Both from experience and reflection, we learn 
the connexion between virtue and happiness ; 
and, consequently, the great lessons of mor- 
ality which are obvious to the capacity of all 
mankind could never have been suggested to 
them merely by a regard to their own interest. 
Indeed, this discovery which experience makes 
to us of the connexion between virtue and 
happiness, both in the case of individuals and 
of political societies, furnishes one of the most 
pleasing subjects of speculation to the phi- 
losopher, as it places in a striking point of 
view the unity of design which takes place in 
our constitution, and opens encouraging and 



delightful prospects with respect to the moral 
government of the Deity. 

The man who is most successful in the 
pursuit of happiness, is not he who proposes 
it to himself as the great object of his pursuit, 
To do so, and to be continually occupied with 
schemes on the subject, would fill the mind 
with anxious conjectures about futurity, and 
with perplexing calculations of the various 
chances of good and evil. Whereas the man 
whose ruling principle of action is a sense of 
duty, conducts himself in the business of life 
with boldness, consistency and dignity, and 
finds himself rewarded with that happiness 
which so often eludes the pursuit of those who 
exert every faculty of the mind in order to 
attain it. 

Divine Providence has constituted the order 
of things in such a sort, as to make the rule 
of natural self-preservation consistent with 
the fundamental principle of universal benevo- 
lence, and the doing as we would be done by? 
For my own part, I must confess, I never 
could conceive that an all-wise, just, and 
benevolent being would contrive to make that 
to be our duty which is not, upon the whole 
and generally speaking, — -even without the 



8 

consideration of a future state — our interest 
likewise. 

14 That which renders beings capable of 
moral government is their having a moral 
nature, and moral faculties of perception and 
of action. That we have this moral approv- 
ing and disapproving faculty is certain from 
our experiencing it in ourselves, and recog- 
nizing it in each other. It is manifest a 
great part of common language and of com- 
mon behavior over the world is formed upon 
supposition of such a moral faculty, whether 
called Conscience, Moral Reason, Moral Sense, 
or Divine Reason, whether considered as a 
sentiment [perception] of the Understanding, 
or as a perception [sentiment] of the Heart, 
or, which seems the truth, as including both. 
Nor is it at all doubtful in the general what 
course of action this faculty or practical dis- 
cerning power within us approves, and what it 
disapproves. For, as much as it has been 
disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever 
ground for doubt there may be about particu- 
lars, yet in general there is in reality a uni- 
versally acknowledged standard of it. It is 
that which all ages and all countries have 
made profession of in public, — it is that which 



9 

every man you meet puts on the show of, — it 
is that which the primary and fundamental 
laws of all civil constitutions over the face of 
the earth make it their business and endeavor 
to enforce the practice of, upon mankind, 
namely justice, veracity, and regard to com- 
mon good." 

The intentions of nature, in associating the 
ideas of the beautiful and the good, cannot be 
mistaken. Much, I am persuaded, might be 
done by a judicious system of education, in 
following out the plan which nature has her- 
self, in this instance, so manifestly traced ; 
as we find, indeed was done to a very great 
degree in those ancient schools, who con- 
sidered it as the most important of all objects 
to establish such a union between philosophy 
and the fine arts, as might add to the natural 
beauty of virtue every attraction which the 
imagination could give her, and affords addi- 
tional evidence of the beneficient solicitude 
with which nature allures to the practice of 
our duty. 

"Do you imagine," says Socrates to Aris- 
tippus, "that what is good is not beautiful ? " 

How delightful are our feelings when we 
are conscious of doing well ? By a species of 



10 



instinct we know ourselves to be the object of 
the esteem and attachment of our fellow 
creatures, and we feel that we enjoy the 
approbation of the invisible witness of our 
conduct. 

Although, however, this sense of merit which 
accompanies the performance, good actions con- 
vinces the philosopher of the connexion which 
the Deity has established between virtue and 
happiness, he does not proceed on the supposi- 
tion, that on particular occasions miraculous 
interpositions are to be made in his favor. 
That virtue is the most direct road to happi- 
ness he sees to be the case even in this world ; 
but he knows that the Deity governs by gen- 
eral laws ; and when he feels himself dis- 
appointed in the attainment of his wishes, he 
acquiesces in bis lot, perseveres in well-doing, 
and looks forward with hope to futurity. 
This belief of the connexion between virtue 
and good fortune has plainly taken its rise 
from the natural connexion between the ideas 
of virtue and merit, a connexion which, we 
may rest assured, is agreeable to the general 
laws by which the universe is governed, 
although not always immediately apparent. 



it 

The strongest presumption of a future state 
is deduced from our natural notions of right 
and wrong ; of merit and demerit ; and from 
a comparison between these and the general 
course of human affairs. 

The very notion of virtue implies the no- 
tion of obligation. Every being who is con- 
scious of the distinction between right and 
wrong, carries about with him a law which 
he is bound to observe notwithstanding he 
may be in total ignorance of a future state. 

"For when the Gentiles, which have not 
the law, do by nature the things contained in 
the law, these having not the law, are a law 
unto themselves." 

"Right, implies duty in its idea. To per- 
ceive an action to be right, is to see a reason 
for doing it in the action itself, abstracted 
from ail other considerations whatever ; and 
this perception, this acknowledged rectitude 
in the action, is the very essence of obligation, 
that which commands the approbation and 
choice, and binds the conscience of every 
rational human being/' We are under an 
obligation to right, which is antecedent, and 
in order and nature superior to all other. 



12 

Dr Clarke has expressed himself nearly to 
the same purpose. "The judgment and con- 
science of a man's own mind concerning the 
reasonableness and fitness of the thing; is the 
truest and formalest obligation ; for whoever 
acts contrary to this sense and conscience of 
his own mind is necessarily self -condemned ; 
and the greatest and strongest of all obliga- 
tions is that which a man cannot break 
through without condemning himself. So far, 
therefore, as men are conscious of what is 
right and- wrong, so far they are under an 
obligation to act accordingly." 

This view of human nature is the most 
simple, so it is the most ancient which occurs 
in the history of moral science. It was the 
doctrine of the Pythagorean school, as appears 
from a fragment of Theages, a Pythagorean 
writer, published in Gale's Opuscula Mytholo- 
gica. It is also explained by Plato in some 
of his dialogues. 

Adam Smith says, "upon whatever we sup- 
pose our moral faculties to be founded," I quote 
his own words, "whether upon a certain modi- 
fication of reason upon an original instinct 
called a moral sense or upon some other prin- 
ciple of our nature, it cannot be doubted that 



13 



they are given us for the direction of our con- 
duct in this life. They carry along with them 
the most evident badges of their authority, 
which denote that they were set up within us 
to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions ; 
to superintend all our senses, passions, and 
appetites ; and to judge how far* each of them 
was to be either indulged or restrained. 

"Since these, therefore," continues Mr Smith, 
"were plainly intended to be the governing 
principles of human nature, the rules which 
they prescribe are to be regarded as the com- 
mands and laws of the Deity promulgated by 
those vicegerents which he has thus set up 

within us By acting according to 

their dictates we may be said, in some sense, 
to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance, 
as far as in our power, the plan of Provi- 
dence. — Theory of Moral Sentiments. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



III 

029 522 807 6 



Hollinger Corp. 
P H 8.5 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

111 



029 522 807 6 



Hollinger Corp. 
pH 8.5 



